The U.S. Supreme Court recently denied New York state’s request to review lower court decisions that mandated the state to pay half of the expenses for desegregating the public schools in Yonkers. This case, which began in 1980, is expected to continue to be a source of contention for many years to come. The Supreme Court appeal specifically addressed the state’s responsibility to share the costs of the existing desegregation plan in the Yonkers district, which amounts to $85 million annually.
However, there is still an unresolved portion of the case in a federal district court that addresses whether the state will have to pay an additional $1.1 billion over the course of eight years to address remaining traces of segregation in the school system. A federal district judge previously found evidence of segregation in the district, including low expectations from teachers towards minority students and inadequate use of multicultural teaching methods. However, in a ruling last year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit ordered the district court to reassess its conclusion regarding the existence of segregation in the Yonkers system.
Nevertheless, the 2nd Circuit court upheld the district court’s orders, requiring the state to cover 50% of the ongoing expenses for a desegregation plan implemented in 1986. This plan includes the establishment of magnet schools and voluntary busing. Both the district and appeals courts have determined through various rulings that the actions and inactions of the state have contributed to segregation in housing and schools in Yonkers. In its previous ruling, the appeals panel rejected the state’s argument that it should receive credit for the general magnet school aid it provides to Yonkers.
New York state argued in its appeal to the Supreme Court that the decisions of the 2nd Circuit could set a precedent for other courts to hold states liable for the unconstitutional actions of their local school districts and municipal subdivisions. In response, lawyers for the Yonkers district claimed that the state had already sought review from the Supreme Court regarding the issue of liability for half of the desegregation costs. The justices had declined the state’s appeal in 1997. The Supreme Court declined, without providing a comment, to hear the most recent appeal in the case of State of New York v. Yonkers Board of Education (Case No. 99-1370).
Additionally, last week the court voted 5-4 to strike down a section of a federal law that required cable television operators to completely block sexually explicit channels or only transmit them when children were unlikely to be watching. This ruling in the case of U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group Inc. (No. 98-1682) addressed provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that aimed to solve the issue of "signal bleed," where scrambled sexually explicit programming can still be viewed or heard by nonsubscribers.
Most cable systems complied with the 1996 law by restricting sexually explicit channels to the hours between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., although advancements in technology have allowed cable subscribers to fully block unwanted channels. Playboy, a provider of sexually explicit channels available through subscription, challenged this provision of the law, alleging that it violated the First Amendment. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the majority, agreed and stated that the law’s requirements were a content-based restriction that failed to meet the strict scrutiny standard under the First Amendment. He argued that there was a less intrusive alternative available. Another aspect of the law mandates cable operators to block undesired channels upon request from any household.
Justice Kennedy emphasized that the history of free expression law has consistently upheld cases involving speech that many citizens may find offensive or distasteful. Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined him in the majority opinion. In dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer expressed that the overturned provision served the same purpose as laws that restrict children’s access to adult establishments or x-rated movies. He argued that the law provided independent protection for numerous families with working parents and unsupervised children at home. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Antonin Scalia joined him in dissent.
